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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The issue of the trial court failing to instruct the jury as to the definition of 
taking is appropriate to be considered under the plain error analysis. The definition of a 
taking does involve a purpose to deprive the owner of the property, which has not been 
shown by the evidence in the instant case. Therefore, Appellant has been erroneously 
convicted of aggravated robbery as it relates to Count I. 
In addition, this Court can address the insufficiency of the evidence and lack 
of adequate jury instructions under a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Just as the 
Appellant argues that it was reversible error for the trial court to instruct the jury as to the 
definition of a taking, it was similarly prejudicial error and a violation of Appellant's right 
to effective assistance of counsel for his trial lawyer to not offer such an instruction. 
Contrary to the State's argument, there was no evidence presented from a 
qualified expert sufficient to demonstrate that Farias suffered serious bodily injury as 
required by the aggravated robbery statute. Evidence from a law enforcement officer, not 
qualified in any medical field, that the alleged victim was "in critical condition" or at risk 
of death, is insufficient evidence of serious bodily injury. 
This Court may address Appellant's claim that the admissibility of the video 
tape was improper due to lack of foundation under an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim. When the Court looks at such an issue in that light, the "invited error" doctrine does 
not come into play as argued by the State. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT CAN ADDRESS THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE AS 
TO THE ELEMENT OF "TAKING" UNDER THE PLAIN ERROR ANALYSIS 
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A. Standard of Review 
Because Appellant's trial counsel did not ask for a specific jury instruction 
defining the element of "taking" this Court may still consider such argument under the plain 
error analysis or to avoid manifest injustice. See State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ^ f 30, 992 
P.2d 951, 961 (Utah 1999); State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1998)1. In order to 
demonstrate plain error, defendant must show: 1) error, 2) that the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court, and 3) that the error was harmful. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1208 (Utah 1993). 
B. Error 
Appellant submits that contrary to the State's contention, this is a sufficiency 
of the evidence issue, and absent trial counsel's request to submit an instruction to the jury 
regarding the definition of taking, it is appropriate for this Court to consider that error under 
the plain error doctrine. This is also not a situation in which invited error should preclude 
this Court's consideration of the issue. If the State failed to prove an element of the offense 
1
 See also Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 949 F.2d 677 (3rd Cir. 1991)(holding that 
in the absence of objection at trial relative to instructing the jury on the State's burden of 
disproving self-defense, such error was sufficiently obvious to permit the court on appeal 
to consider it); State v. McCullum, 656 P.2d 1064 (Wash. 1983)(holding that defense 
counsel's failure to offer burden of proof instruction regarding self-defense, nor his 
objection to this lack of instruction was still an issue entitled to be reviewed on appeal). 
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deliberations of the jury. Error not affecting a substantial right is often characterized as 
harmless." Graham, § 103.1, at 5-10 (citing cases).3 
"Normally, the government bears the burden of proving that a non-
constitutional error was harmless."4 Further, 
where an error does not impact a federal constitutional right, the test used for 
determining an error's harmfiilness is whether there is a reasonable likelihood 
that absent the error a different result would have occurred. This 
determination should be made on the basis of the record as a whole.... [T]he 
determination is best made by viewing the error in conjunction with other 
errors which occurred during the trial. 
State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 784-785 (Utah 1992). 
Here, the question is whether the inadequacy of the jury instructions to define 
an element of the offense affected Appellant's substantial rights. There is no question that 
one of the basic and fundamental constitutional protections is the requirement that an 
accused be proven guilty of each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In the 
3
 A "reversible error" or "prejudicial error" is a non-harmless error. See Graham § 
103.1, at 10 n.9. See generally Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490 
(1978)(discussing harmless error); United States v. Simpson, 1 F.3d 186 (10th Cir. 1993). 
A
 Jefferson, 925 F.2d at 1255 n.15; accord United States v. Sides, 944 F.2d 1554, 
1560 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 604 (1991). 
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instant case, considering that the jury had no instruction on how to define or interpret one 
of those elements, constitutes a substantial impact on Appellant's constitutional rights. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT MAY ALSO ADDRESS, UNDER AN INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM, TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO 
OFFER ADEQUATE JURY INSTRUCTIONS AS TO AN ELEMENT OF 
THE OFFENSE5 
A. Standard of Review 
To prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, a defendant must show: "(1) that 
counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defendant." State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct 2052 (1984). 
B. Trial Counsel }s Deficient Performance 
Appellant submits that trial counsel's failure to offer an appropriate instruction 
as to the definition of a "taking," "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" as 
guaranteed by his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Classon, 935 P.2d at 532. Appellant's 
5
 In conjunction with Appellant's plain error argument above, he submits that this 
Court can also consider his sufficiency of the evidence/inadequate jury instruction 
argument under an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
-9-
trial counsel failed to offer any specific instruction defining what "taking" meant. As argued 
in Point I, above, this error is especially harmful given the fact that Appellant was unable 
to cross-examine Farias as to what allegedly occurred from his perspective. The Utah 
Supreme Court in Classon also stated that when defendants make such claims of 
ineffectiveness, they must overcome the presumption that "counsel's challenged action or 
omission was sound trial strategy." Id. Appellant submits that the presumption is overcome 
by the notion that there is no rational basis for which failure to instruct a jury adequately on 
the elements of the offense would be strategic. 
C The Error of Trial Counsel Prejudiced Appellant's Right to Effective 
Assistance of Counsel and a Fair Trial 
This Court has held that the Strickland standard does not end the analysis 
under and ineffective assistance claim, and that "the benchmark forjudging any claim of 
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning 
of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." 
State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Appellant submits that when 
considering that he was prevented from cross-examining the alleged victim, Jose Farias, the 
inadequate jury instructions with regard to that aggravated robbery count clearly prejudiced 
his right to a fair trial, and absent his counsel's deficiency the trial would have resulted in 
-10-
a different outcome. Without a proper instruction as to the element of a taking, the jury had 
no direction or guidance as to how to consider the evidence before them. This is not a 
circumstance where Appellant has invited the error as claimed by the State. See Aplee. Brf. 
at 11 -12. It is absurd to suggest that any lawyer for a criminal defendant would "invite error" 
in failing to prove an element of an offense. That is precisely the type of situation that calls 
for appellate review. Appellant can claim plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel in 
order to preserve the argument that the State has failed to meet their burden in proving each 
and every element of an offense. 
Even though the court in Classon held that the Strickland test was not met, 
they further looked at the claimed errors in light the defendant's fundamental right to a fair 
proceeding. Classon, 935 P.2d at 533. As noted there, "the right to counsel plays a crucial 
role in the adversarial system embodied in the Sixth Amendment, since access to counsel's 
skill and knowledge is necessary to accord defendants the w ample opportunity to meet the 
case of the prosecution' to which they are entitled." Id. Consequently, the adversarial 
process was so undermined by the failure to prove an element of the offense that the trial in 
the instant case cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result. Id. 
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POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE 
"SERIOUS BODILY INJURY" 
As Appellant argues in his Opening Brief, there was insufficient evidence 
presented to meet the element of serious bodily injury under the Aggravated Robbery statute. 
The State argues that the evidence demonstrated that Farias suffered a substantial risk of 
death. See Aplee. Brf at 21. However, the State makes that claim absent any evidence at trial 
from any medical professional or otherwise qualified individual. There was no testimony at 
trial that indicated Farias was ever at risk of dying. The fact that he may have been 
unconscious for a period of time, does not satisfy the definition of serious bodily injury. 
Moreover, the State relies on other definitions from other jurisdictions to demonstrate that 
unconsciousness does qualify as serious bodily injury. However, to use the State's argument, 
the plain language of the statute does not support such an interpretation. 
In addition, Deputy Huggard's testimony that he believed Farias to be in 
critical condition is similarly not persuasive. There was no evidence that Deputy Huggard 
had any type of medical degree or expert qualification sufficient to support his opinion as 
to the medical status of Farias. As such, there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that 
Farias suffered a substantial risk of death under the serious bodily injury statute. The State 
-12-
makes much of counsel's admitted mistake in arguing that Count I should be reduced to an 
aggravated assault. See Aplee. Brf at 23 n. 11. Counsel's inadvertent mistake in referring to 
the aggravated assault statute, rather than the assault statute was unintentional.6 Clearly, the 
crux of Appellant's argument was, and is, that there was no evidence presented of serious 
bodily injury, and to argue otherwise is contrary to that argument. The State points out 
counsel's error and in seeking to correct that, Appellant submits that because evidence of 
serious bodily injury was lacking, this charge should be, at most, an assault under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-102 (1953, as amended). 
POINT IV 
THIS COURT CAN REVIEW THE IMPROPER ADMISSIBILITY OF THE 
VIDEO TAPE UNDER AN INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
CLAIM 
A. Standard of Review 
To prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, a defendant must show: "(1) that 
counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
6
 Appellant actually refers in his Opening Brief to the lesser included jury instructions 
which fall under the assault statute. The first is an assault with substantial bodily injury, a 
Class A misdemeanor, and the second is a simple assault, a Class B misdemeanor. 
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defendant." State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). 
B. Trial Counsel ys Deficient Performance 
Appellant submits that trial counsel's failure to object to the admissibility of 
the video tape fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" as guaranteed by his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. Classon, 935 P.2d at 532. Appellant's trial counsel failed to 
continue with his objection as to the adequate foundation for the video tape, given that no 
witness testified that what appeared on the video tape was an accurate reflection of what 
happened. As Appellant argues in his Opening Brief at Point III, the proper foundation 
required under Rule 901 of the Utah Rules of Evidence was lacking. The fact that 
Appellant's trial counsel chose to forego any continued objection to the proper foundation 
does not end the analysis or prevent Appellant from arguing ineffective assistance despite 
the State's claim of "invited error." See Aplee. Brf. at 24. In addition, it cannot be argued 
that such error was sound trial strategy given the prejudicial nature of the video tape and its 
effect it would have had on the jury. 
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C. The Error of Trial Counsel Prejudiced Appellant }s Right to Effective 
Assistance of Counsel and a Fair Trial 
As to the second prong of the Strickland analysis, Appellant submits that based 
upon the erroneous admission of the video tape, counsel's conduct does meet the criteria for 
"conduct [that] so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial 
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524 (Utah 
CtApp. 1997). 
The State is simply relying on the language of the rule, rather than the 
interpretations that the appellate courts have held involving challenges under Rule 901. As 
demonstrated in Appellant's Opening Brief, Sate v. Purcell, 111 P.2d243 (Utah 1985); and 
State v. Hygh, 111 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985), both stand for the proposition that photographic 
evidence illustrative of a witness's testimony only becomes admissible when the sponsoring 
witness can testify that it is a fair and accurate representation of the subject matter based on 
that witness's personal observation. Therefore, the analysis goes beyond just what "the 
proponent claims it to be," but involves actual personal observation. Since that was lacking 
as to the evidence of the alleged assault as it pertained to Deputy Huggard, admission of the 
video tape was sufficiently prejudicial as to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 
-15-
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests this Court reduce 
the conviction on Count I involving Farias to an assault and reverse his conviction as to 
Count II involving Calvillo; and/or grant him a new trial. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Counsel for Appellant requests oral argument in the above matter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of June, 2002. 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
By 
RONALD J. YENGICH 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby declare that I mailed/delivered two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief, postage prepaid, this day of June, 2002, to: 
Kenneth A. Bronston 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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